

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 10485 01 OF 03 091559Z

45

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SP-02 L-01 INR-05 NSC-05

NSCE-00 ACDA-10 PM-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01 EA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 /057 W

----- 129981

P R 091544Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9682

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 10485

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, FR, VN, US, SU

SUBJECT: LUNCHEON WITH PRC AMBASSADOR APRIL 7

SUMMARY: PRC AMBASSADOR TSENG T'AO AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF HAD LUNCHEON WITH ME AND MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AT THE RESIDENCE ON APRIL 7. THE CHINESE WERE QUITE RELAXED, AND TSENG SPOKE FREELY -- AND IN GENERAL PREDICTABLY -- ON A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS. MOVEMENT ON U.S./PRC NORMALIZATION WAS NOT SO RAPID AS THE PRC WOULD WISH, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE OF TAIWAN. THE SOVIET THREAT WAS OF GREAT INTEREST, AND TSENG REQUESTED OUR VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NON-NUCLEAR U.S./USSR OR WESTERN EUROPEAN/USSR CONFLICT. TSENG UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND NOTED THAT THE ITALIAN AND FRENCH PARTIES SERVED SOVIET INTERESTS. TSENG WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FRENCH 1978 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION PROSPECTS. TSENG THOUGHT THE DRV WAS STAUNCHLY INDEPENDENT AND WOULD NOT BE A SOVIET PAWN.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 10485 01 OF 03 091559Z

THE U.S. SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD GOOD RELATIONS

WITH THE DRV. TSENG SAID CHINESE INTERNAL DEBATE WAS FOLLOWING MAO'S LINE AND WOULD RESULT IN STRENGTHENING CHINA. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY, AND IN PARTICULAR NO POSSIBILITY OF SOFTENING OF THE LINE TOWARD THE USSR. THE EXCHANGE WAS USEFUL, AND TSENG EXTENDED A RETURN INVITATION.

1. I INVITED THE PRC AMBASSADOR AND MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF (INCLUDING HIS WIFE WHO IS ALSO FIRST COUNSELOR) TO LUNCHEON AT THE RESIDENCE APRIL 7. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY WITH NO SIGNS OF ANY STRAIN DESPITE THE DISTURBANCE IN PEKING. WE HAD NOT YET HEARD THE DIVESTITURE OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND PARTY POSTS, BUT THE CHINESE MAY HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THIS NEWS. AMBASSADOR TSENG WAS PREPARED TO ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE ABOUT CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICS. HE RESPONDED ALONG LINES FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT AND GAVE LITTLE INSIGHT INTO THE RECENT EVENTS IN PEKING. HE CONTINUES TO IMPRESS ME AS SOMEONE AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN HIS OWN COUNTRY AND WITH THE ASSURANCE TO SPEAK ON ALMOST ANY SUBJECT. HE SAID HE WISHED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AT HIS EMBASSY.

2. U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS. I NOTED THAT I HAD KNOWN WELL THE PREVIOUS HEADS OF OUR LIAISON OFFICE IN PEKING AND COULD ASSURE TSENG THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD FIND AMBASSADOR GATES A WORTHY SUCCESSOR, SOMEONE CAPABLE OF FURTHER IMPROVING U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS. I NOTED THAT AS A FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES WOULD PROVIDE A SYMPATHETIC EAR IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT AND WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN ABLY THE U.S. POSITION. TSENG REPLIED THAT THE PRC SAID IT FELT THAT WHILE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WERE GOOD, PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION WAS TOO SLOW. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM REMAINED TAIWAN. THIS WAS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PRC WOULD NOT ALTER ITS POSITION. THE PRC COULD ACCEPT SOME FORMULA SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH JAPAN HAD ACCEPTED, A FORMULA WHICH WOULD INCLUDE RENUNCIATION OF THE U.S./ROC TREATY, THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 10485 01 OF 03 091559Z

WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES, AND THE ENDING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TAIPEI. I NOTED THAT THE TAIWAN PROBLEM HAD DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, AS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 10485 02 OF 03 091601Z

45

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SP-02 L-01 INR-05 NSC-05

NSCE-00 ACDA-10 PM-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01 EA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 /057 W

----- 129971

P R 091544Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9683

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 10485

LIMDIS

HAD OVERALL U.S./CHINESE RELATIONS IN THE PAST. TSENG SAID HIS GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THIS AND WAS PREPARED TO BE PATIENT.

3. U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. I TOLD TSENG HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED BY THE PRESS DISTORTIONS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS SURROUNDING THE WORD "DETENTE". THIS ADMINISTRATION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, DOES NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE THREAT POSED TO US BY THE SOVIET UNION. I NOTED THAT DESPITE ALL OF THE ACCUSATIONS BEING MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN, THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH WOULD EMERGE FROM THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE ONE DEVOTED TO STRONG MILITARY CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE USSR. TSENG ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, OR A CONVENTIONAL WAR BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE USSR WITHOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION. I NOTED THAT THE CONFLICT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT TAKE EITHER FORM. THE USSR WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 10485 02 OF 03 091601Z

WISH TO AVOID A
NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD THEREFORE
SEEK TO PROFIT FROM WEAKNESSES AND DIVISIONS, AND WORK
THROUGH THE INTERPOSITION OF THIRD COUNTRIES -- AS IT
HAS DONE WITH THE CUBANS IN ANGOLA. TSENG PRESSED THE
USUAL CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, BUT DID
NOT REMARK THAT BY ADOPTING THE HELSINKI PACKAGE WE
WERE LACKING IN SENSITIVITY TO THE SOVIET MENACE.

4. COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERN-
MENTS. I EXPLAINED THE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD ARISE FOR
THE U.S. FROM COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. I NOTED THE CURRENT DRIFTING,
PARTICULARLY IN FRANCE AND ITALY, WHICH MIGHT PERMIT
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES TO PROFIT AT THE POLLS. TSENG
NOTED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF
FRANCE AND ITALY WERE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL (DESPITE
RECENT PLOYS BY BOTH PARTIES TO MASK THIS CONTROL)
AND IMPLIED THAT OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
PARTIES WERE ALSO NOT INDEPENDENT, NATIONAL PARTIES.
HE AGREED THAT THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE EXCESSIVELY
DIVIDED AND HENCE UNABLE ADEQUATELY TO PLAY A ROLE IN
CONTAINING SOVIET EXPANSIONIST IMPERIALISM. IN DIS-
CUSSING THE RECENT EC MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG, TSENG
AGREED WITH OUR ANALYSIS THAT THE FAILURE REPRESENTED
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EC GOVERNMENTS, WHO WERE MORE
CONCERNED WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF REMAINING IN
POWER THAN WITH THE LONGER TERM INTERESTS OF EUROPE AS
A WHOLE.

5. INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS. TSENG ASKED FOR OUR
EVALUATION OF FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS. WE NOTED
THE CURRENTLY DIFFICULT PREDICAMENT IN WHICH PRESIDENT
GISCARD FINDS HIMSELF, IN PARTICULAR THE FAILURE OF
HIS ATTEMPT TO WOO THE CENTER. BY 1978 THE IMPROVEMENT
IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION SHOULD AMELIORATE HIS
ELECTION PROSPECTS. IN ADDITION, MITTERRAND AND SOME
OF HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NOT FULLY AWARE OF SOME OF THE
RISKS OF WORKING WITH A MOSCOW-CONTROLLED COMMUNIST
PARTY, AND THE SITUATION WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE CLEARLY
DANGEROUS TWO YEARS HENCE. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 10485 02 OF 03 091601Z

ELECTIONS WERE THEREFORE NOT ENTIRELY GLOOMY. TSENG
APPEARED SOMEWHAT REASSURED BUT STILL CONCERNED.

6. PRC VIEW OF THE DRV. I ASKED TSENG ABOUT THE DRV, WHICH APPEARED TO US TO BE SERVING THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TSENG SAID THE VIETNAMESE ARE VERY INDEPENDENT AND PROUD PEOPLE AND HE DOUBTED THAT AFTER 40 YEARS OF WAR THEY WILL BECOME DEPENDENT ON OR SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH HANOI. WE NOTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH ONCE WE WERE CONVINCED HANOI WAS NOT BEING EXPANSIONIST, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE USSR. TSENG REMINDED US THAT THE U.S. ACTIONS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM WERE "MISTAKES" WHICH HAD LEFT THE SOVIET UNION STRONGER IN THE AREA THAN IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. (I DID NOT NOTE THAT CHINESE ACTIONS HAD FACILITATED THE OUTCOMES WHICH HAD FAVORED THE USSR.) COMMENT: FROM TSENG'S REMARKS, ONE COULD GATHER THAT THE PRC WAS HAVING ITS OWN PROBLEMS WITH THE VIETNAMESE SPIRIT OF "INDEPENDENCE", BUT THEY INTEND TO HANDLE THE SITUATION WITH PATIENCE IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL OVERPLAY THEIR ROLE IN THE AREA WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 10485 03 OF 03 091728Z

45

ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EURE-00 SP-02 L-01 INR-05 NSC-05

NSCE-00 ACDA-10 PM-03 SAM-01 SAJ-01 EA-06 CIAE-00

DODE-00 /057 W

----- 000692

P R 091544Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9684

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 10485

LIMDIS

THEIR USUAL HEAVY-HANDEDNESS AND PROMPT THE VIETNAMESE TO REASSERT "INDEPENDENCE", AS CHINA HAD DONE IN THE LATE 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S.

7. INTERNAL CHINESE RELATIONS. I MENTIONED THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND ASKED ABOUT THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA. TSENG SAID THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN HAD GROWN OUT OF THE EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGY CAMPAIGN OF LAST YEAR AND WAS FOLLOWING CHAIRMAN MAO'S LINE WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO A STRONGER, MORE DEVELOPED, AND BETTER CHINA. TSENG NOTED HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH CHAIRMAN MAO FOR 40 YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT HE WAS SELECTING THE LINE WHICH WOULD BEST SUIT CHINA. TSENG SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY FEARS ABOUT THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN IN CHINA; ONLY THE SOVIET "POLAR BEAR" NEED FEAR THIS CAMPAIGN, SINCE IT WOULD RESULT IN A STRONGER CHINA. I NOTED THAT WE OF COURSE WERE NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED BY CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INDEED THOUGHT THAT ANYTHING WHICH STRENGTHENED CHINA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 10485 03 OF 03 091728Z

SERVED THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN ASIA AND THE WORLD. TSENG SAID THAT THE CURRENT DEBATES IN CHINA WOULD RESULT IN NO CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH WAS CHARTERED BY CHAIRMAN MAO AND FOLLOWED HIS CONSISTENT LINE. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WOULD BE NO SOFTENING OF THE PRC OPPOSITION TO SOVIET EXPANSIONIST IMPERIALISM. TSENG INDICATED THE PRC POSITION TOWARD U.S. IMPERIALISM IS ROOTED IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE, AND NO MATTER WHOMIGHT BE IN A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN CHINA IN THE FUTURE -- THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY OTHER POSITION BUT TOTAL OPPOSITION.

8. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EASTERN EUROPE. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME PRESS MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE WHICH HAD FOLLOWED ARTICLES ON SONNENFELDT'S ALLEGED REMARKS IN LONDON. I NOTED THAT BOTH FOR FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS THE U.S. WOULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN, MUCH LESS ENCOURAGE, SOVIET DOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. WHILE IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID A NUCLEAR WAR, WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO ABANDON OUR EFFORTS FOR GREATER INDEPENDENCE FOR THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FROM SOVIET DIRECTION BY ANY MEANS SHORT OF WAR. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXTEND ITS CONTROL BY MOVING INTO YUGOSLAVIA AT TITO'S DEATH. THIS WOULD BE

A VERY BLATANT EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF SOVIET IMPERIAL-
ISM WHICH WE AND THE CHINESE OPPOSE.

9. COMMENT: TSENG MAY WELL HAVE HAD SOME SPECIFIC
GUIDANCE FOR HIS REMARKS, BUT HIS SELF-CONFIDENT MANNER
IMPLIED HE WOULD IN GENERAL KNOW WHAT TO RESPOND EVEN
WITHOUT IT. IN ANY CASE, HE AVOIDED ANY INDISCREET
DETAILS CONCERNING INTERNAL POLITICS. THE TONE
WAS ALWAYS FRIENDLY AND UNDERSTANDING, AND HE REFRAINED
FROM ANY SHARP CRITICISMS OF CURRENT U.S. POLICY (SUCH
AS "DETENTE"), ALTHOUGH HE GENTLY CHIDED US ON SEVERAL
OCCASIONS, AS WHEN HE NOTED THAT CHINA'S GREAT
DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE REVOLUTION HAD BEEN DONE DESPITE
FIRST THE AMERICAN AND THEN THE SOVIET EMBARGO. TSENG
QUITE FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO CHAIRMAN MAO AND HIS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PARIS 10485 03 OF 03 091728Z

SPECIFIC POLICIES AS WELL AS HIS GENERAL THOUGHT, NO
DOUBT IN ORDER TO SHOW HE WAS FOLLOWING THE ORTHODOX
LINE.
RUSH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AMBASSADORS MEETINGS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, SOCIAL RECEPTIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 APR 1976
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976PARIS10485
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760135-0275
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760478/aaaacohj.tel
Line Count: 356
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <17 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: LUNCHEON WITH PRC AMBASSADOR APRIL 7 SUMMARY: PRC AMBASSADOR TSENG T'AO AND MEMBERS OF HIS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, FR, VN, US, SU
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006